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The Politics of International Judicial Appointments
Erik Voeten*
I. INTRODUCTION
How, if at all, do governments influence the choices that international judges
make? This question has justly received ample attention in the literature. Unlike
in the study of American judicial politics, however, relatively few of these
scholarly efforts have been devoted to the question of how governments use the
appointment process to shape the international judiciary. There are some good
reasons for this. International courts cannot easily be stacked with like-minded
judges by a single government. Moreover, (threats of) noncompliance and
withdrawal of institutional support are more credible mechanisms for influencing
judicial behavior in most international settings than in established liberal
democracies.
Yet the politics of the appointment process does shape the composition of
the international judiciary in interesting ways. International judges are much
more diverse in their backgrounds and preferences than is commonly assumed.
To some, the prototypical international judge is a committed professional with
exceptional moral standards who cares deeply about the advancement of
international law and is largely unresponsive to material incentives or political
pressures. To others, international judges are more like diplomats who use legal
reasoning as a guise for making decisions that fit the national interests of the
governments that appointed them.' To the extent that empirical research exists,
it appears to show that the international judiciary contains examples of both
these ideal types as well as many others. More interestingly, this research suggests
that this variation can be understood reasonably well by examining the
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motivations of governments and the institutional details of the appointment
process.
This Article evaluates what we know about the politics of international
judicial appointments and identifies some areas for future research. Although the
conclusion offers some discussion of the normative implications of this research,
this is deliberately not an attempt to identify how the appointment process should
work, but rather an exploration of if and how governments do use the
appointment process to shape the international judiciary. Theoretically, the
Article draws from the broad framework of principal-agent theory, in which
governments are the multiple principals and judges the multiple agents. This
framework does not assume that the agents always do what the principals want
them to do. In fact, the incentives that governments have for delegating a task to
agents typically imply that the agents should have at least some leeway in how
they will execute this task. The precise manner in which governments do affect
judicial behavior through the appointment process depends on the motivations
of judges and governments, as well as on the institutions that govern the
appointment and retention process.
Theoretically, governments can use the appointment process to influence
judicial behavior in two ways. First, they can select judges whom they expect to
make decisions that match their perceived interests. For example, in the
American context, liberal administrations tend to appoint more liberal judges
than conservative administrations. Similar selection behavior is also common in
other liberal democracies and, presumably, in less liberal states. An obvious
difficulty with this strategy is that governments have imperfect ex ante
information about how judges will behave while on the bench. Yet, governments
may be able to make reasonable inferences from past behavior, interviews, or the
political and professional backgrounds of prospective international judges.
Second, governments may use (threats of) ex post sanctions and rewards to
provide incentives to judges. There is a large body of evidence in the American
context that shows that the method of retention is an important source of
influence on judicial behavior. For example, trial judges who are retained
through popular elections are much more punitive in their sentencing behavior
than appointed trial judges, presumably because the electorate favors tough
sentences.2 More generally, there is considerable evidence that domestic judges,
like everyone else, are at least partially motivated by material or career
incentives.3 It is at least plausible that reappointment processes have effects on
2
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international judges as well, given that their prospects for prestigious
international judicial careers depend in large measure on the willingness of
national governments to advance their candidacies for high international judicial
office.
It is not entirely clear if and how governments are actually willing and able to
use the international judicial selection process in this way. First, while in the
American context we may reasonably presume that liberal governments prefer
liberal judges, a similar link between ideology in the political and judicial arenas is
much less obvious in international affairs. As such, we need to examine the
motivations that governments have when they appoint judges. I argue that past
research has made overly simplistic and homogenous assumptions about what
motivates governments when they interact with international courts, including
when they appoint judges. Governments are neither simply picking the best
qualified candidate nor are they singularly obsessed with limiting sovereignty
costs, although both motivations are sometimes important. There are also
circumstances under which governments would like to use judicial appointments
to signal a credible commitment to a certain cause or to advance norms of liberal
internationalism. At other times, judicial appointments appear motivated by
concerns about the distributional consequences of international court rulings.
Finally, and not unimportantiy, governments frequently pick candidates for
international judgeships to reward political loyalty rather than merit. Section II
discusses the consequences of these governmental motivations for the
functioning of the international judiciary.
Second, international courts are, by definition, formed by multiple
governments. As such, the influence of any one government is inherently
limited. There is important variation in institutional details across international
courts that shape the ability of governments to influence judicial behavior. On
some courts, all or some governments have a de jure or de facto right to appoint
a judge. On other international courts, votes in multilateral institutions determine
whether a country will have a national serving on the court. Some international
judges are appointed on a case-by-case basis, others for relatively short
renewable terms, and again others for long nonrenewable terms. Sometimes the
behavior of international judges may not be easily observable since the
decisionmaking process is shrouded in secrecy (that is, there are no public
minority opinions). The extent to which these and other institutional details
affect what types of judges are appointed and how well national governments are
able to influence them is the topic of Section III.
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II. WHAT MOTIVATES GOVERNMENTS WHEN THEY APPOINT
INTERNATIONAL JUDGES?
Treaties that establish international courts typically stipulate that "judges
shall be of high moral character" and possess the required qualifications for
appointment to high judicial office.4 These criteria leave considerable room for
discretion. That such discretion is exercised can be inferred from the remarkable
variation in the backgrounds of international judges. For example, a recent study
showed that about one-third of the judges on the European Court of Human
Rights ("ECtHR") had experience as judges on high national courts.' Around
one-fourth of the judges were recruited from the corps diplomatique or
domestic bureaucracies of states. The remainder of the judges were academics,
politicians (including former ministers of justice and parliamentarians), and
private lawyers with experience in human rights litigation. Another study
revealed a similar distribution for the international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and Rwanda ("ICTR").6 At the time of election,
about half of the new judges held a high national judgeship and about one-fourth
of the new judges held a nonjudicial governmental position (mostly as
diplomats), whereas the remainder were academics, international judges on other
courts, or human rights lawyers. About 70 percent of international criminal
judges held an official nonjudicial governmental function at some point before
accessing their international judgeships, whereas about 20 percent of the judges
had held a significant official position with an activist non-governmental
organization.
These different career backgrounds have predictable behavioral implications.
For example, in previous research I showed that ECtHR judges who were
former diplomats show a much greater respect for the raison d'6tat than do
ECtHR judges who spent the majority of their careers in private practice or who
were academics.' This means that diplomats were more likely both to favor their
4

See, for example, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950), art 21, 213 UN Treaty Ser 221; Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (1998), art 36(3), UN Doc No A/CONF.183/9, reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998) ("Rome
Statute").

5

For more details on data collection, see generally Erik Voeten, The Poltics of InternationalJudicial
Appointments: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 61 Ind Org 669 (2007). Data is
available from Erik Voeten, European Court of Human Riaghts, available online at
<http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/ICdata-files/Page364.htm> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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own government in a dispute and to grant a wide margin of appreciation to
states more generally. There are also other ways in which governments may glean
how judges will likely behave once elected. Richard Steinberg found that both
the EU and the United States Trade Representative conducted extensive
interviews with candidates for the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
appellate body with an explicit focus on the degree to which the candidate can
be expected to have an expansive view of judicial decisionmaking.8
The rationale underlying international judicial appointments remains mostly
implicit in both the law and political science literatures. The law literature is
concerned that governments may not always advance the most qualified
candidates for international judgeships,9 but little is known about what does
motivate governments in selecting international judges. Most political science
theories assume that governments are predominately motivated by limiting the
extent to which judges are activist in their rulings, although these theories vary in
their assessment of how successful governments are likely to be at reining in
judges.' 0 The assumption that governments desire restraint implies that
governments should seek to appoint diplomats or others who can be expected to
exercise restraint on the bench.
A plausible explanation for the apparent variety in the activist tendencies of
international judges is that governments may have other motivations than
preventing sovereignty costs or selecting the "best" candidate when appointing
judges. The following subsections examine four such motivations and their
implications for judicial behavior. In the order in which they will be discussed,
these motivations are that governments: (a) may want to appoint independent
judges to increase the credibility of their commitments to a certain cause; (b) may
be motivated by the distributive implications of court judgments; (c) may be
influenced by norms of what an appropriate judge should be; and (d) may use
international judicial appointments as a form of patronage.

5

Richard H. Steinberg, JudicialLawmakng at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,and Political Constraints,
98 AmJ Intl L 247, 264 (2004).
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and Philippe Sands, International Courts and Tribunals and the Independence of the InternationalJudge, 44
Harv Intl LJ 271 (2003).
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A. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS
First, some governments prefer delegation to an independent international
court because they want to make a credible commitment that they will adhere to
a certain set of goals. Following this line of reasoning, the primary function of
international courts is that they constrain government behavior by limiting the
types of policies governments can implement. Such constraints are credible only
when judges are truly independent from governmental pressures and dedicated
to the policies to which a government wishes to commit." Incentives to create
these constraints are analogous to the well-known incentives governments may
have to appoint conservative and independent central bankers if they want to
limit inflation in the long run.
The credible-commitment argument is most often made in the context of
international human rights courts. New and unstable democracies may want to
commit to an international human rights court to lock in future governments
that may be less inclined to protect human rights' 2 or to send a costly signal to
other states that they are committed to protecting human rights. 3 Such a signal
may be especially valuable in the context of regional integration, such as in the
European Union. The implication is that different governments may have
different incentives to appoint judges who are likely to be activist. In earlier
research, I indeed found that new democracies that aspired to EU membership
were more likely than other democracies to appoint ECtHR judges with an
activist streak, including a willingness to vote against their own governments. 4
Older democracies already had a credibly established human rights record, and
were thus more concerned about sovereignty costs. New democracies not in the
picture for EU membership did not have the same incentives as others to
appoint more activist judges.
International criminal tribunals are other plausible examples of credible
commitment. Independent tribunals that are not subject to state intervention
plausibly help states credibly signal that they are interested in bringing war
criminals to justice and deterring future war crimes rather than the politicized
exercise of victor's justice. If the former were the primary aim of governments,
11
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Note the analogy to the argument that governments voluntarily erected checks and balances on
their behavior in order to credibly commit to policies that advanced economic development, most
notably refraining from expropriation of private property. See Douglas C. North and Barry R.
Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in
Seventeentb-Centuy England, 49 J Econ Hist 803, 803-32 (1989).
Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rgbts Regimes: DemocraticDelegation in Postwar Europe, 54
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Intl Org 217, 220, 222 (2000).
Voeten, 61 Ind Org at 670-71 (cited in note 5).
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then the grant of discretion to judges would have a fiduciary character, with little
use for oversight or ex post accountability to states. In fact, any perception that
judges or prosecutors could be removed for failing to implement the wishes of
their principals would undermine the purpose for which the tribunal was created.
An examination of retention decisions shows some evidence for this. While
there are examples of international judges who were not retained, this only rarely
appears to be because of the content of the decisions that they took while on the
court. The General Assembly has sanctioned ICTY and ICTR judges for lethargy
and other evidence of incompetence,15 but not because of their interpretations of
war-crimes law or their decisions to acquit or convict individuals. On the
ECtHR, I found three instances where there was some suggestion that judges
were removed because of decisions they made, although in each instance the
decision was also accompanied by a change in domestic government. 6 The most
notable was the Moldovan judge Pantiru, who was ousted by the newly elected
Communist government, which vowed to only "send real patriots" to Moldova's
"diplomatic missions."' 7 Similarly, four governments allegedly replaced activist
judges on the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") following the controversial
1994 Codorniu judgment. 8 Again, these decisions were accompanied by changes
in government.
There is therefore no evidence that governments systematically sanction
permanent judges who make unfavorable decisions, although it does occur at
times. As explained later in this article, this may well be different for ad hoc or
ad litem judges. 9 Moreover, the threat of post hoc removal does not need to be
exercised to be effective. I found that ECtHR judges from countries with lower
income per capita were less likely to find violations against their own
governments than judges from wealthier countries.2" Presumably the former
judges were more worried about losing their jobs as the opportunity costs were

15

See, for example, the discussion of Judge Adolphus Karibi-White in Section I.D.

16

This concerned Moldovan judge Pantiru, Bulgarian judge Gotchev, and Slovakian
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Straznicka. See Erik Voeten, What Motivates InternationalJudges? Evidence from the European Court of
Human Rights, 2007 Am Pol Sci Assn Ann Meetings 12, available online at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=705363> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
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available online at <http://www.azi.md/news?ID=1415> (visited Dec 5, 2008). Judge Pantiru did
not dissent from a finding of a violation in Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova, no
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Olivier Costa, The European Court ofJustice and Democratic Controlin the European Union, 10 J Eur Pub
Poly 740, 757 n 15 (2003).

19
20

See Section III.A.
See Voeten, 2007 Am Pol Sci Assn Ann Meetings at 22-23 (cited in note 16).

Winter 2009

judge

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

larger. (Salaries for international judges are much higher than judicial salaries in
the poorer European countries.)
B. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND THE DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS
OF COURTS
A second rationale for the creation of independent international courts is
that they serve as mechanisms for resolving disputes between states. In this view,
courts are not so much established to constrain governments but to help enforce
contracts (treaties) between governments. Disputes over the terms or
interpretation of treaties may be settled through diplomatic means or through
delegation to a third party. The latter solution reduces transaction costs, but also
has distributional consequences. In a diplomatic resolution, relative power
should matter much more than when disputes are settled through legal means.
As such, less powerful states should be much more likely to favor less political
control and more independence of judges. Moreover, active enforcement of
treaties that establish free trade or regulate access for foreign investors is more
desirable to states that are net exporters of goods and capital. So, in the EU
context we should see that small exporting economies are most favorably
disposed towards a court that actively seeks to enforce a common market.
The primary examples in international law are the ECJ, the WTO disputesettlement understanding ("DSU"), and various arbitration mechanisms. There is
considerable evidence for the general claim that increasing trade flow led to a
more activist ECJ.21 In the WTO context, there is also substantial confirmation
that the most powerful players, the EU and US, are most active in their attempts
to influence the DSU, especially its appellate body. 22 However, little is known
about which governments are most likely to appoint what types of judges. There
is virtually no research on judicial appointments and judicial behavior on these
courts. This is primarily due to data limitations, especially the absence of public
dissenting opinions, making it difficult to assess heterogeneity on the court.
In research on the ECtHR, I found that governments with open economies
and those more favorably disposed towards European integration tended to
advance candidates for ECtHR judgeships with a more activist orientation.
Governments that were more skeptical towards supranationalism appointed
judges who exercised more self-restraint on the bench. Thus, governments that

21
22

See, for example, Alec Stone-Sweet and Thomas Brunell, Constructing a SupranationalConstitution:
Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European Community, 92 Am Pol Sci Rev 63, 69 (1998).
Steinberg, 98 Am J Intl L at 274 (cited in note 8).
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appeared to have more to gain from an activist court appointed more activist
judges."
Another implication is that geopolitics may matter, in that judges may favor
respondent states that are political, military, or economic allies of their national
governments in dispute resolution. I did not find such an effect in the context of
the ECtHR.24 Yet, in the ICJ context, which involves direct disputes between
governments, Eric Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo found that judges do tend
to be more favorable towards disputants at similar wealth levels and from similar
regime types as their home countries." Both variables can be thought of as
proxies for similar geopolitical interests.
Finally, the distribution of nationalities of judges on courts may be an
indication that governments do worry about the distributional outcomes of
international courts' decisions. For example, if making a credible commitment to
refrain from victor's justice were the only motivation for appointing ICTY
judges, then we would have expected an overrepresentation of judges from
liberal countries who were not engaged in the conflict. However, judges from
NATO countries were vastly overrepresented on the ICTY, even in comparison
to non-NATO liberal democracies.26 It may thus be that NATO members
wanted some reassurance that their national interests were guarded.
C. NORMS AND INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
Third, international norms may play a role in whom governments wish to
advance for international judgeships. Two types of norms may be important.
First, governments may create international courts because they wish to establish
a liberal international order, in which the rule of law plays a greater role. Such
motivations may be strongest for liberal democracies. Liberal democracies have
generally been most active in creating international courts, especially
international human rights courts and criminal tribunals. It is plausible that
governments more inclined towards liberal internationalist norms would advance
candidates for international judgeships that are likely to advance these norms on
the court. Although there is no direct support for this, there is some evidence
that liberal internationalist governments are more active in advancing their
candidates for judgeships. Countries with high levels of civil liberties at home
were more likely to have their candidates for international judgeships elected on
23
24
25

26

Voeten, 61 Intl Org at 670-71 (cited in note 5).
Voeten, 2007 Am Pol Sci Assn Ann Meetings at 4 (cited in note 16).
Eric A. Posner and Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased, 34 J Legal
Studies 599, 616-17 (2005).
Danner and Voeten, Who Is Running the International Criminal Justice System? at 10 (unofficial
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international criminal tribunals than were other countries. 27 Moreover, more
internationalist countries (as measured by their participation in UN peacekeeping
operations) were more likely to get their judges elected.28 If liberal internationalist
governments are more successful in advancing their judicial candidates, it would
seem likely that the median international judge on a court is more liberalinternationalist than the median member state of that court. This result may not
hold for courts that are less motivated by liberal internationalist norms, such as
the ICJ.
Second, there may be professional norms that emerge about what the
appropriate qualifications are for an international judge on a particular court. In
studying judicial appointments to international criminal tribunals, Allison Danner
and I found that the variation in professional backgrounds of successful
candidates decreased over time. 29 There appeared to be a convergence towards
high-level national judges as appropriate candidates for judgeships.30 The model
of the academic as international criminal judge decreased dramatically in
popularity as concerns about the efficiency of the tribunals increased.
(Academics were frequently accused of lengthening proceedings and writing long
dissents.) After the first round of ICTY elections, only three academics were
newly elected onto the court. All three were citizens of permanent UN Security
Council (P-5) members: US law professor Theodor Meron (ICTY, 2001),
Russian professor Sergei Egorov (ICTR, 2003), and Chinese professor Tieya
Wang (ICTY, 1997). That only P-5 members, who were relatively assured of
success, would propose academics as International Criminal Tribunal judges
suggests that academics generally do not fare as well in elections as candidates
with other qualifications. We confirmed this intuition through a multivariate

analysis of election results. 31 As discussed below, the influence of such
professional norms is ikely to be greater in the context of competitive judicial
elections than when each state has a right to appoint a national.
D. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AS PATRONAGE

Fourth, governments may have more parochial motives for international
judicial appointments. For some international courts, governments may simply
not care all that much about decisions. They may want representation more for
prestige than out of a desire to influence decisions. International judicial

27

Id at 11 (unofficial pagination).

28

Id at 13 (table 1) (unofficial pagination).

29

Id at 13-14 (unofficial pagination).

30

Id.
Id.

31
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appointments may be an opportunity for governments to reward loyal
functionaries. International judgeships are often well-compensated, prestigious,
and located in reasonably attractive locations.32 For example, the annual salary of
ECtHR judges was about 189,000 Euro, free from income tax. 33 This salary is
high in comparison to what legal practitioners earn in many European countries.
For example, the estimated annual salaries of constitutional court justices in
Moldova and Slovakia were only 9,000 and 28,000 Euro respectively.34
That patronage is a factor is suggested by an independent evaluation of the
ECtHR appointment process conducted by Interights, which concluded that
"[e]ven in the most established democracies, nomination often rewards political
loyalty more than merit., 3' A change in party control of government is the most
frequently mentioned reason for why ECJ judges are not renewed.36 There are
many examples of this phenomenon in the ECtHR as well. The Austrian judge
Fuihrman, a former Social-Democratic parliamentarian, was replaced after his
party lost domestic elections. Similarly, in 1998 Bulgaria did not put its sitting
judge Gotchev on the nominee list after the Socialists lost in elections.3" Such
shifts could of course be motivated by ideology but, as the Interights report
suggests, it appears that pure patronage matters as well.
If political loyalty rather than merit are reasons for appointment and
retention, this raises concerns both about the quality of international judges and
the effort they put into their work. Especially problematic in the early years of

32

Arusha is a notable exception and the ICTR has had great difficulties attracting and keeping the
highest-quality judges.

33

Based on 2004 data. On July 26, 2008, this was equivalent to US$ 296,141. The President of the
Court receives an additional C 12,092 and the Presidents of Sections an additional € 6,046. On the
Status and Conditions of Senice ofJudges of the European Court of Human Pghts, Committee of Ministers
Res (2004) 50 (Dec 15, 2004).

34

Based on 2000 data. World Bank, Worldwide Legal and JudidalIndicators, available online at <http://
www4.worldbank.org/legal/database/Justice/Pages/jslndicatorl.htm>
(visited Dec 5, 2008).
These salaries were not tax-free.

35 Jutta LImbach et al, Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights 4
(Interights 2003).
36
See generally Karen J. Alter, Who Are the Mastersof the Treaty? European Governments and the European
Court ofJuslice, 52 Intl Org 121 (1998).
37

But see generally Jean-Frangois Flauss, Radioscopie de l'lkction de lanouvelle Cour europienne des droits de
l'homme, 9 Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l'Homme 435, 440 (1998), English translation
available in Limbach et al, Law and Practice of Appointments to the European Court of Human Rights at
67-83 (cited in note 35). Flauss alleges that this occurred because of Gotchev's refusal to dissent
in Lukanov v Bugaria,no 21915/93, Eur Ct HR 1997-II, no 34. More likely, however, Gotchev was
the victim of changing domestic political circumstances. He was removed from office shortly after
the Bulgarian Socialists lost domestic elections. After the Socialists regained control in 2002,
Gotchev was advanced as a candidate for the ICC. He currently serves on Bulgaria's
Constitutional Court.
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international criminal tribunals was the absence of judges with experience in
running a criminal trial. Criminal judges are less likely to climb the political
ladder than academics, legal experts in bureaucracies, or judges engaged in
administrative review. As a result, only one-third of the judges elected to the
ICTY and ICTR had criminal trial experience as a judge, prosecutor, or defense
lawyer. This absence of trial experience among judges is widely perceived to have
reduced the efficiency of the court. Perhaps the most notorious example of poor
trial management is the behavior of judges in the Celebici trial (the first trial that
charged Muslims with war crimes).38 According to one NGO report:
Mhe uninterested judges-led by the presiding Judge Adolphus Karibi-White
from Nigeria, sometimes assisted by Judge Jan-are falling asleep more and
more often, only to be woken after the third or fourth cry from defence or
39
prosecution lawyer: "Objection, Your Honour!"
The allegation that Judge Karibi-White slept through large parts of the trial
also featured in the appeal by the defendants, who argued that the tapes of the
trial "clearly and unambiguously paint a disturbing picture of a Judge prone to
fall asleep during all phases of the trial, at almost any time when he was not
speaking, examining a document, or otherwise being actively engaged."40 The
Appeals Chamber, however, held that "his sleeping was only of secondary
concern."'" The three judges, Saad Saood Jan (Pakistan), Karibi-White (Nigeria),
and Odio Benito (Costa Rica) failed in their bids for reelection in 1997 even
though they were advanced as candidates by their national governments. This
highly unusual outcome suggests both that the UN membership at large is
concerned with the quality and efficiency of judges and that individual
governments do have incentives to reward loyal service. Moreover, the ICC
explicitly requires that a subset of its candidates have extensive criminal-law
experience (list A candidates). Judges with academic or broader international law
backgrounds have generally been appointed to the appeals chamber rather than
the trial chambers.

38

39

40

41

Prosecutorv Delaic,Case No IT-96-21 -T (ICTY 1998). See also Danner and Voeten, Who Is Running

the InternationalCriminalJusiceSystem? at 15-16 (unofficial pagination) (cited in note 6).
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Tribunal Update 36: Last Week in The Hague (uly 7-12,
1997), available online at <https://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc-state=hen&s=o&o=p=tri& =
EN&s=f&o=180467> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
United Nations, Selective Prosecution, available online at <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/
judgement/ce-aj010220e-10.htrn> (visited Dec 5, 2008).
Id.
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III. INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION IN THE SELECTION AND
RETENTION PROCESS
The previous section examined the extent to which government motivations
shape the judicial selection process. That section assumed that governments are
generally able to advance their preferred choice. Whether governments are able
to shape the international judiciary in this manner depends on how the judicial
selection process is organized. The following sections discuss three aspects of
institutional variation that are important for understanding the extent to which
governments can influence judicial behavior: the term of appointment for judges,
the extent to which the appointment process is delegated to a multilateral
institution (and thus is beyond the control of individual governments), and the
extent to which judicial choices are observable. In this discussion, it is important
to remember that governments themselves have designed these institutional
features. Thus, if they designed the process such that they have less potential for
affecting judicial behavior, this may well be for one of the reasons discussed in
the previous section.
A. TENURE
First, some judges are appointed on an ad hoc basis, whereas others receive
renewable or nonrenewable fixed terms. On many international tribunals, at least
some of the judges are appointed by states parties for the purpose of resolving a
particular dispute or case. This is especially common in the context of arbitration
where disputing states parties may each appoint arbiters who jointly appoint a
third arbiter. However, it also occurs on regular international courts. For
example, the ECtHR allows a respondent government to appoint an ad hoc
judge to a panel in case the regular national judge cannot sit for some reason.
Similarly, the ICJ allows any party to a "contentious" case to nominate a judge of
its choice (usually of its nationality), if a judge of its nationality is not already on
the bench.
Eric Posner and John Yoo call these judges "dependent" in that they can
easily be rewarded or punished by national governments based on whether they
please these governments in the case at hand.42 While these judges are not
officially representatives of their governments, one can expect that they reliably
favor the governments that appointed them. This is certainly true in the ICJ. 43 It
also holds in the ECtHR. On "important" cases, when a ruling favored the
respondent government, 100 percent of ad hoc judges and 95 percent of regular
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judges from the respondent's country voted with the majority.44 This compared
to 81 percent of other judges. When the ruling went against the respondent state,
33 percent of ad hoc judges and 16 percent of regular national judges dissented
compared to only 8 percent of other judges.45
Thus, nationality matters for all judges but even more so for ad hoc judges.
This gives incentives for governments to assure that ad hoc rather than regular
judges are assigned to the most sensitive cases. I found some evidence for this in
the ECtHR context. While ad hoc judges are supposedly assigned only when the
regular judge has to recuse himself or herself, I found that ECtHR Article Three
(torture) cases were somewhat more likely to have an ad hoc judge than were
other cases, even while including fixed effects and relevant controls. An
alternative explanation for this finding is that judges were more likely to excuse
themselves from sensitive cases, perhaps anticipating a decision that they would
prefer not to make.
The general rationale for allowing ad hoc judges and nationals is twofold.
First, from a legal perspective, it may help to have a judge with an understanding
of a nation's law and legal system while discussing a case. This is especially
important for a court such as the ECtHR, which engages in complex
interpretations of domestic law, including determinations of whether all
domestic remedies have been exhausted. However, it is somewhat questionable
how credibly ad hoc judges can communicate this knowledge to the other panel
members given their presumed bias. If other panel members second-guess the
motives of the national judge, this may reduce the quality of judicial
deliberations. A second motivation is more political. The guarantee that a
national will serve on any panel may give some assurance to states parties that
their side of the story will be heard in judicial deliberations. This may encourage
governments to submit disputes and accept the compulsory jurisdiction of an
international court.
Second, among permanent judges, there is some variation in the length of
terms and whether terms are renewable. In general, governments have more
opportunities to influence behavior through ex post sanctions and rewards if
terms are short and renewable. There is some evidence that this matters. In the
ECtHR context, I found that judges approaching the compulsory retirement age
of seventy were somewhat more likely to find a violation against their own
governments than were other judges, controlling for a host of other relevant
factors.46 Presumably, these judges are perceived as less dependent on their own
government for future job prospects than are other judges.
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That short, renewable terms could be a problem has received recognition in
the creation of new courts and attempts to reform existing courts. For example,
most pre-existing courts and tribunals have renewable terms, while ICC judges
are appointed for a nine-year nonrenewable term.47 Protocol XIV proposed to
replace six-year renewable terms with nine-year nonrenewable terms in the
ECtHR.48 The Russian Duma, however, rejected the proposal, making it the only
Council of Europe member state that has failed to ratify the protocol.49 This
again illustrates the earlier point that governments vary in the extent to which
they would like to see international judges be independent.
B. ELECTION AND APPOINTMENT PROCESSES
Another important source of variation is whether national governments are
entitled to appoint a permanent judge to a court or whether competitive
elections are held in multilateral institutions. Obviously, in the second instance
national governments have a much-reduced opportunity to freely select
candidates ex ante and to sanction judges ex post, although governments
generally maintain control over candidate lists.
On some international courts, like the ECJ, all governments have the right to
appoint a national judge."0 Although appointments are by common accord of all
governments, national candidates are rarely, if ever, second-guessed. In the postProtocol XI ECtHR, governments can propose a list of three judges from which
the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly elects one.5 ' Governments can
rank the candidates and the Assembly generally, but not always, elect the
government's favorite. The Assembly has also occasionally sent back a list of
candidates for lack of qualifications.5 2 The most important impact of this system
of shared control between national governments and a multilateral body has
been to increase the number of female judges, as most instances where the
Assembly voted for a different candidate than the government's preferred
candidate involved female candidates. s3
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In the cases of the ICJ, ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, governments retain control
over nomination lists, but judges are elected by the UN General Assembly (or in
the case of the ICC, the Assembly of States Parties). 4 This is a constraint
especially on governments that are not guaranteed that their candidate will win.
(Candidates from one of the five Security Council permanent members have a de
facto guarantee of being elected). Although we found that nationality was the
biggest factor determining whether or not a candidate for an international
criminal tribunal judgeship was elected, we did find that countries did better
when they advanced candidates that fit a certain professional profile." As noted
earlier, this means primarily that a candidate has held a high national judgeship,
has international experience, and is not a full-time academic. In all, it appears
that professional norms or norms to promote gender balance have a greater
impact when judges are selected through competitive elections.
In the case of the WTO, panel members and members of the appeals
chamber are appointed by a multilateral institution, the Dispute Settlement Body
("DSB"). Panel members are appointed on a case-specific basis in consultation
with the parties to the dispute.56 The seven-member appellate body has four-year
terms. The US and the EU are de facto assured of a seat on the body and are
widely thought to set the acceptable boundaries for candidates from other
countries as well.57
There are few examples of nomination procedures where international
organizations do not have to rely on national governments for nomination lists.
An example is the transitional court system in Kosovo, which was essentially run
by international organizations. The availability of such judgeships may be
important as they provide opportunities for international judges that take
decisions that are unfavorable to their national governments. For example, the
Moldovan judge Tudor Pantim, who was ousted by his government after one
term as an ECtHR judge, was appointed as an international judge at the Supreme
Court of Kosovo by the United Nations.
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C. OBSERVABILITY OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR

Third, on some courts judicial behavior is easily observable whereas on
others it is not. The ECJ traditionally does not allow public dissenting opinions.
On the WTO, public dissents are discouraged and rare. On the ICJ, ECtHR, and
the international criminal tribunals, public minority opinions are relatively
common. A consequence of secrecy is, of course, that governments cannot
observe whether the ECJ judges they advanced indeed voted in accordance with
national interests. This reduces the ability of governments to use ex post
punishments and rewards.
I am not aware of any systematic research into the causes and consequences
of the presence and absence of dissenting opinions. On the ECJ, it appears to be
a matter of tradition. When the court was founded, all participating states had
civil-law legal systems in which public minority opinions on courts of review
were generally not allowed. Such rules are generally hard to change. On the
WTO, it is plausible that public dissents are discouraged out of fear that they
may encourage noncompliance. After all, governments could use a minority
dissent supported by foreign judges as evidence that reasonable disagreement
about the legality of a certain action persists. This may be used as an argument
for legitimizing defection. However, I am not aware of any evidence for such an
effect.
IV. CONCLUSION

Understanding if and how governments influence judicial behavior requires
an understanding both of government motives and of the institutional
opportunities to act upon these motives. Past research has made overly simplistic
and homogenous assumptions about what motivates governments when they
interact with international courts, including when they appoint judges.
Governments are not simply picking the best candidates nor are they stacking
courts with diplomats well-versed in the raison d'6tat. Limiting sovereignty costs
and the effectiveness of judges are sometimes motivations, but there are also
others. Sometimes governments use appointments to signal that they are
committed to an international court that may take costly negative decisions
against them. At other times, appointments are motivated by distributive
concerns or by a desire to promote a set of international norms. Patronage is
another important and potentially disruptive motivation for international judicial
appointments.
The precise institutional mechanisms that govern the appointment and
retention process greatly influence the ability of governments to affect judicial
behavior. This Article highlights in particular the impact of different tenure
arrangements, the extent to which appointments are delegated to multilateral
institutions or remain within the direct control of national governments, and the
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extent to which judicial choices are observable. Given that governments
generally create these institutional mechanisms, the variation in institutional
mechanisms is again testament to the different motivations governments may
have when they create courts.
The arguments in this Article rely quite strongly on empirical evidence from
only a few international courts, especially the ECtHR, the ICJ, and the
international criminal tribunals. Most studies of international courts study these
courts as unitary actors rather than as committees of individuals. This is partially
driven by the lack of data, either too few cases and/or no public minority
opinions. Yet, it would be useful to systematically examine the professional
backgrounds of judges on other courts, most notably the ECJ and the WTO's
DSB. In addition, remarkably little is known about international arbitrators.
As explained in Section I, this Article examines the politics of the
appointment process from a positive rather than a normative perspective. Space
constraints prevent a full discussion of normative issues, but there are important
ways in which the empirical findings may well prove informative for normative
debates. Most authors have stressed the importance of impartial and
independent judges, 8 although some prefer dependent judges.5 9 The preference
for dependence stems largely from a desire to ensure that international judges are
accountable in some transparent manner to democratically elected
representatives. From a perspective of accountability, the notion that
governments seek to influence the overall ideological direction of an
international court may well be desirable. So if governments respond to an
activist international court by collectively appointing judges who are more
inclined toward self-restraint, then this would seem a legitimate exercise of
democratic accountability. Such behavior would help counter criticisms that
international courts remain unchecked and engage in "wayward activism."6
Concerns about transparency and accountability are also strong arguments in
favor of the use of public minority opinions, which may yield concerns from the
perspective of judicial independence as it allows politicians to make
reappointment conditional on decisions.
This type of accountability to political leaders may well violate some notions
of impartiality and independence, although political leaders exercise a similar
influence in many domestic judicial systems, including the United States. A more
serious potential violation of judicial independence would occur if international
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judges feel pressured to favor the national interests of their national
governments in specific cases. If such incursions were to occur with regularity,
the differences between resolving disputes by legal and diplomatic means would
be rendered moot. The empirical research reported here suggests that
nonrenewable terms of medium length, limits to the use of ad hoc or ad litem
judges, and competitive judicial elections all contribute to shielding judges from
such pressures.
A full normative analysis of how concerns about independence and
accountability should be weighted is beyond the scope of this Article. The
suggestion from the preceding paragraphs is that such a trade-off may be
achieved through appointment procedures that facilitate opportunities for
governments to shape the overall direction of the court, but minimize
opportunities for governments to influence judges on individual cases. More
empirical research on how institutional details shape judicial behavior on
international courts would be a most welcome contribution for future normative
debates on how the burgeoning international judicial system can best achieve its
potential.
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